pi-ext
bugabingas pi extensions
owned by bugabinga
test leaks UI restoration symmetry
da7ff42f0cb895fb076b15a8f9ef04f02a3433d2
Oliver Jan Krylow <oliver@bugabinga.net> ·
unsigned
Browse filesCompare with HEAD
Changed files (4)
extensions/leaks/__tests__/pi-direct.test.ts
Modified 30 +const LEAK_PLACEHOLDER_RE
= /__LEAK_[A-Z0-9_]+_[a-f0-9]{12}(?:_\d+)?__/;
32 +function serialized(value
: unknown) {
33 + return JSON.
stringify(value);
36 +function expectLocalRestored(
39 + placeholder
: string,
41 + const text
= serialized(value);
42 + expect(text).
toContain(secret);
43 + expect(text).not.
toContain(placeholder);
44 + expect(text).not.
toMatch(LEAK_PLACEHOLDER_RE);
30 47 function ui(confirm
= true) {
31 48 const notices
: string[]
= [];
32 49 const statuses
: string[]
= [];
186 + it(
"restores every local Pi surface symmetrically",
async ()
=> {
187 + const runtime
= fakePi();
188 + leaks(runtime.pi
as never);
190 + await runtime.handlers.
get(
"session_start")?.({}, view.ctx);
191 + const secret
= "ghp_" + "S".
repeat(
36);
192 + const providerPayload
= { nested: { text: secret } };
193 + const provider
= await runtime.handlers.
get(
"before_provider_request")?.(
194 + { payload: providerPayload },
197 + const placeholder
= 198 + serialized(provider).
match(LEAK_PLACEHOLDER_RE)?.[
0]
?? "";
199 + expect(placeholder).
toBeTruthy();
200 + expectLocalRestored(providerPayload, secret, placeholder);
202 + const contextSource
= [{ role:
"tool", content:
`ctx ${secret}` }];
203 + const context
= await runtime.handlers.
get(
"context")?.(
204 + { messages: contextSource },
207 + expect(
serialized(context)).
toMatch(LEAK_PLACEHOLDER_RE);
208 + expectLocalRestored(contextSource, secret, placeholder);
210 + const messageUpdate
= {
213 + content: [{ type:
"text", text:
`stream ${placeholder}` }],
216 + await runtime.handlers.
get(
"message_update")?.(messageUpdate, view.ctx);
217 + expectLocalRestored(messageUpdate, secret, placeholder);
221 + input: { path:
"file.txt", note:
`call ${placeholder}` },
223 + await runtime.handlers.
get(
"tool_call")?.(toolCall, view.ctx);
224 + expectLocalRestored(toolCall, secret, placeholder);
226 + for (
const hook
of [
"tool_execution_start",
"tool_execution_update"]) {
227 + const event
= { args: { command:
`exec ${placeholder}` } };
228 + await runtime.handlers.
get(hook)?.(
event, view.ctx);
229 + expectLocalRestored(
event, secret, placeholder);
232 + const toolResultEvent
= {
233 + content: [{ type:
"text", text:
`result ${placeholder}` }],
234 + details: { preview: [
`detail ${placeholder}`] },
236 + const toolResult
= await runtime.handlers.
get(
"tool_result")?.(
240 + expectLocalRestored(toolResultEvent, secret, placeholder);
241 + expectLocalRestored(toolResult, secret, placeholder);
243 + const messageEnd
= await runtime.handlers.
get(
"message_end")?.(
247 + content: [{ type:
"text", text:
`final ${placeholder}` }],
252 + expectLocalRestored(messageEnd, secret, placeholder);
169 255 it(
"blocks unresolved leak placeholders in mutating tools outside leaks",
async ()
=> {
170 256 const runtime
= fakePi();
171 257 leaks(runtime.pi
as never);
extensions/leaks/__tests__/structures.test.ts
Modified 143 + it(
"does not redact sensitive-name code references", ()
=> {
144 + const engine
= new __test.
LeaksEngine();
146 + "const token = loadToken(email);",
147 + "const key = match[1] as string;",
148 + "console.log(` access_token: ${token.access_token ? 'present' : 'missing'}`);",
149 + "const key = `${redaction.path}: ${redaction.labels.join(', ')}`;",
150 + "let session: BaseTestSession;",
151 + "const value: ${account.hasAccessToken = token.access_token;",
154 + for (
const sample
of samples) {
155 + expect(engine.
redactText(sample,
"provider").
text, sample).
toBe(sample);
156 + expect(__test.
findAssignmentSpans(sample), sample).
toEqual([]);
143 160 it(
"stoplist does not block keys that overlap with SENSITIVE", ()
=> {
144 161 const longValue
= "abcdef1234567890";
extensions/leaks/__tests__/unit.test.ts
Modified 86 86 expect(
JSON.
stringify(result.redactions)).not.
toContain(sensitiveValue);
89 + it(
"restores every provider redaction back to original text", ()
=> {
90 + const engine
= new __test.
LeaksEngine();
91 + const secret
= "ghp_" + "R".
repeat(
36);
93 + message:
`send ${secret}`,
94 + nested: [{ text:
`again ${secret}` }],
97 + const redacted
= engine.
redactDeep(original,
"provider");
98 + expect(
JSON.
stringify(redacted.
value)).not.
toContain(secret);
99 + expect(redacted.count).
toBe(
2);
101 + const restored
= engine.
restoreDeep(redacted.
value);
102 + expect(restored.
value).
toEqual(original);
103 + expect(restored.count).
toBe(
2);
89 106 it(
"fails open when a detector throws", ()
=> {
90 107 const engine
= new __test.
LeaksEngine({
extensions/leaks/src/structures.ts
Modified154 154 const value
= match[
2]
as string;
155 155 if (ASSIGNMENT_STOP_KEYS.
has(key.
toLowerCase()))
continue;
156 156 if (
!isSensitiveKey(key))
continue;
157 + if (
isCodeReference(value))
continue;
157 158 if (
isWeakValue(value)
&& !highConfidenceSecretShape(value))
continue;
159 160 makeSpan(match,
2, value, [
label(key,
"structure")],
"structure"),
198 +function isCodeReference(value
: string) {
199 + const text
= value.
trim();
201 + text.
startsWith(
"$")
|| 202 + /[()[\]{}]/.
test(text)
|| 203 + /^[A-Z][A-Za-z0-9_$]*$/.
test(text)
|| 204 + /^(?:[A-Za-z_$][A-Za-z0-9_$]*\.)+[A-Za-z_$][A-Za-z0-9_$]*$/.
test(text)
197 208 function matches(